In this paper, we analyze the security of a generalized anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol recently proposed by Choi and Park at IWDW 2004. We prove that it has not met the designers' intended security criteria by showing that an attacker can actually: (1) discover the unique buyer's watermark which was chosen by the watermark certificate center (W CC), and (2) decrypt the encrypted watermarked digital content without any extra cost. Also, it is surprising to note that when designing their protocol, the designers did not take into consideration the conspiracy attacks.
Introduction
In this information age, all types of multimedia information are being stored and processed in digital form, because of many advantages over the traditional analog counterpart. Unfortunately, since the duplication of digital multimedia content results in perfectly identical copies, many multimedia content providers are hesitant to sell/distribute their content digitally. Digital watermarking [15, 5] and digital fingerprinting [12, 13] are mainly designed to overcome this problem−the copyright protection issue. A buyer-seller watermarking protocol is a combination of both; more precisely, it allows to trace redistribution of the digital contents by extracting the original buyer's information (fingerprint) and to prove the content owner by extracting the sellers' information (watermark) from the redistributed contents. Therefore, it does protect the rights and interests of not only the seller but also of the buyer. In the literature, many buyer-seller watermarking protocols have been proposed [1] [2] [3] [4] [7] [8] [9] [10] .
In this paper, we analyze the security of a generalized anonymous buyerseller watermarking protocol recently proposed by Choi and Park at IWDW 2004 [3] . At first glance, the new protocol looks quite attractive because it can be generalized to multi-purchase environments where a set of buyers can purchase multiple distinct contents from a set of sellers, and this solves the open problem stated in Goi et al. [7] . However, we show that it does not achieve the security criteria set out by the designers, namely that an attacker can actually: (1) discover the unique buyer watermark chosen by the watermark certificate center (WCC), and (2) decrypt and obtain the encrypted watermarked digital content. It is also surprising that when designing the protocol, the designers did not consider security against conspiracy attacks when in fact even Memon and Wong [10] − the designers of the original buyer-seller watermarking protocol − had commented that it is undesirable to place complete trust on a single source, including the watermark certification center, and that such attacks had already been considered extensively in this literature [8, 3, 7] . To solve the conspiracy attack, we refer readers to Goi et al. [7] where the buyer should generate his own private watermark and convince the certificate authority that s/he owns the secret watermark, via the zero-knowledge proof protocol.
Related Work
In 1998, Qiao and Nahrstedt [14] presented an owner-customer watermarking protocol that solved the problem of rightful ownership. Unfortunately, it is a symmetric scheme and does not guarantee the buyer's security. The first truly buyer-seller watermarking protocol that withheld the buyer's unique watermark (fingerprint) from the seller was proposed by Memon and Wong [10] . The Memon-Wong protocol is an asymmetric scheme where even the seller is not able to reproduce the unique watermarked content. Since then, several variants of this protocol have been proposed in the literature, including the Chang-Chung protocol and Cheung et al. protocol which were proposed at ICCT '03 [1] and HICSS '04 [2] , respectively. Also worth mentioning is the Lei et al. protocol [9] which is based on the unbinding problem.
Independently of these, the issue of the importance of "anonymity" was raised by Ju et [7] showed that the Choi et al. protocol was still insecure against conspiracy attacks and also can not provide full anonymity. They then proposed a variant that achieves full anonymity. Finally, Choi and Park at IWDW '04 generalized on their earlier ACNS '03 work of [3] to multi-purchase environments. They also claimed that their protocol can be implemented for mobile communication by employing mobile agents with an extra step -delegation step. A comparison of security features and primitive requirements of various proposed buyer-seller watermarking protocols is shown in Table 1 . 
Homomorphic encryption algorithm and linear watermarking scheme are defined in subsection 2.2. ‡ : An encryption algorithm is said to be commutative, if for a multiple encrypted (decrypted) message the same resultant ciphertext (plaintext) will be obtained irrespective of its the order of encryption [7] .
Security Criteria
We describe in this subsection some security criteria that are expected to be achieved by a sound anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol, as follows [7, 3] : -Anonymity. A buyer's identity is protected, unless s/he is found guilty. -Unlinkability. Nobody is able to determine whether the different watermarked contents are purchased by the same buyer. -Traceability. The buyer who has illegally redistributed watermarked contents can be traced. -No-Framing. Nobody can accuse an honest buyer.
-Non-Repudiation. The guilty buyer cannot deny that the unauthorized copies of the content were not created by him.
Obviously, the security of a seller-buyer watermarking protocol is dependent on the underlying watermarking scheme. Hence, the used watermarking scheme must be collusion tolerant; more precisely, nobody can find and delete the embedded watermark (invisible type) from the content without knowing the watermark.
Preliminaries

Notations
For ease of explanation, we stick to the notations used in [3] as follows:
S the seller who sells the digital multimedia content B the buyer who can buy watermarked contents anonymously RC the agent who can verify the buyer's identity and issue the buyer anonymous certificates, Cert(y1) W CC the agent who can issue watermarks to buyers upon request and certify them CA certification authority who can issue the certificate and a pair of keys (x, y) for every agent in the PKI X original content with m elements x1, x2, ..., xm W watermark with n elements w1, w2, ..., wn generated by W CC, where n ≤ m V watermark with n elements v1, v2, ..., vn generated by the seller, where n ≤ m X , X watermarked content X ⊗ W embed watermark, W into X with insertion operation, ⊗ σ random permutation function chosen by S t total number of contents to be purchased text valid set of operations that the agent is allowed to perform while using the certificates string concatenation
Building Blocks
The protocols discussed here use public key cryptography [11] ; each agent, A possesses a pair of keys: public key, y A and private key x A − which are obtained from a certificate authority center (CA). For convenience, we stick to y A ≡ g xA mod p, where p is a large prime such that
2 is also a prime, and g is a generator of the multiplication group, Z p . All arithmetic operations are performed under Z p , unless otherwise specified. We denote E y (m) to mean the message, m encrypted with the public key, y. Any agent can encrypt a message for A using y A , but only A can decrypt this message with x A : D xA [E yA (m)]. Furthermore, A can sign a message by encrypting it with x A , denoted as sign xA (m). We assume that all agents have registered with the CA beforehand and have their own pair of keys: the seller, S with (x S , y S ), the buyer, B with (x B , y B ), RC with (x R , y R ) and W CC with (x W , y W ). Also, the public-key encryption algorithm used in this paper must be homomorphic. A well-known homomorphic encryption algorithm is the RSA with respect to the multiplication operation.
Besides robustness, in terms of various digital processing operations, printing and re-scanning, and collusion attacks, the underlying watermarking scheme adopted must have linearity property. This is because the seller needs to permute the original watermark generated by W CC with a random permutation function, σ before embedding it into the content. The detailed watermark embedding process is described as follows:
Therefore, the robust Cox's invisible watermarking algorithm [5] is a suitable choice and has intensively been used in Memon-Wong protocol and its variants.
An Overview of the Choi-Park Protocol
Basically, there are four steps involved in the Choi-Park Protocol: (1) Registration, (2) Watermarking generation, (3) Watermark insertion, and (4) Copyright violator identification.
In order to ensure that Choi-Park protocol works, several typos and mistakes in [3] have to be corrected. verified by S using y 1 = g xB 1 (anonymous public key of x B1 ) but not y * i . Hence, B has to send y 1 to S. (This will cause the protocol to become linkable although it still provides anonymity service.) Furthermore, according to the definition of the encryption function as used in [3] , the final encrypted watermarked digital content should be defined as
Therefore, the decryption function is performed as follows:
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Fig. 2. Choi-Park Protocol: Watermark Generation
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Choi and Park claimed here that only the buyer with the secret information, x B1 can perform the decryption and then obtain the final watermarked content, X " i . However, we prove in Section 4 that it is not true. For compactness of description, all these steps, except for step (4) , are illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3 , respectively. The proposed protocol is efficient because each step can be completed in one round. During the registration step, as shown in Figure 1, by providing y 1 (which is used for achieving anonymity) , B convinces RC of possession of x B1 via a zero-knowledge proof [6] . We omit the copyright violator identification step as it is straightforward and irrelevant to our attacks and discussions in this paper. We refer interested readers to [3] for further details.
Attacking the Choi-Park Protocol
The main problem of the Choi-Park protocol is the encryption process during the watermark generation step: W CC encrypts each watermark W i with y * [3] that only the buyer with knowledge of x B1 can decrypt Enc W i to get the unique watermark W i based on Eq.(1). This causes several serious security issues, some of which are further explained in detail in following subsections.
Attacking the Buyer's Security
By a Malicious Seller. Once a malicious seller has obtained the unique buyer's watermark, W i as described above, then with all other the necessary information, i.e., X, V i , σ i that he has access to, he can reproduce and redistribute illegally the watermarked content for his own gain. When the illegal watermarked content is found in the market, the innocent buyer will be accused. Hence, "no-framing" and "non-repudiation" cannot be provided.
By any Outsider. With the knowledge of W i , an attacker can simply embed it into a digital content which is not (never) purchased by the buyer, who may never be aware of this. Again, an innocent buyer will be accused.
Attacking the Seller's Security
As mentioned above, with the information y ki 1 , the decryption process can be carried by anyone. Firstly, an attacker intercepts the encrypted watermarked digital content, E y * i (X " i ) during the watermark insertion step and then decrypts it to obtain the watermarked content, X " i , although s/he does not pay to the seller.
Discussions
Our attack exploited the fact that y * i = (y ki 1 , g ki ) is sent in the clear, and that the encryption method used by the designers is mere multiplication with y ki 1 (followed by concatenation with g ki ), and correspondingly, the decryption (see equation (1)) is simply division with the same, which translates to multiplication with the multiplicative inverse of y ki 1 . Although x B1 was used in the generation of y 1 and can therefore be used in the decryption process, the fact is that even without x B1 , decryption can still be done with y 1 . This is very clear from equation (1). This is quite different from the encryption and decryption processes used in RSA-type schemes where both involved exponentiations.
Finally, it is very surprising that during the design of their protocol Choi and Park did not take into consideration of the conspiracy attacks. It is obvious that once the seller colludes with RC or W CC, the anonymity and other security services provided by the protocol will be compromised totally. In order to solve this, the buyer should be responsible to generate his/her own private watermark and convince the certificate authority that s/he owns the secret watermark, via the zero-knowledge proof protocol, as proposed by Goi et al. in [7] .
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that Choi and Park protocol is flawed. This is due to the leak of y * i during the protocol that allows an attacker to discover the unique buyer watermark and also further decrypt the encrypted watermarked digital content. Therefore, it cannot provide "no framing" and "non-repudiation", "unlinkability" and "untraceability" security criteria, even if the underlying watermarking scheme is secure. Furthermore, the protocol is not secure against conspiracy attacks.
